Justice Reform: Who\u27s Got the Power by Mayba, Yevgeniy
Themis: Research Journal of Justice Studies and Forensic
Science
Volume 3 Themis: Research Journal of Justice Studies
and Forensic Science, Spring 2015 Article 3
5-2015
Justice Reform: Who's Got the Power
Yevgeniy Mayba
San Jose State University
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/themis
Part of the Criminology and Criminal Justice Commons, and the Law Enforcement and
Corrections Commons
This Peer-Reviewed Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Justice Studies at SJSU ScholarWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Themis: Research Journal of Justice Studies and Forensic Science by an authorized editor of SJSU ScholarWorks. For more information, please contact
scholarworks@sjsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Mayba, Yevgeniy (2015) "Justice Reform: Who's Got the Power," Themis: Research Journal of Justice Studies and Forensic Science: Vol. 3 ,
Article 3.
Available at: http://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/themis/vol3/iss1/3
Justice Reform: Who's Got the Power
Abstract
As the US prison population continues to rise despite the significant decrease in crime rates, scholars and
social activists are demanding comprehensive reforms to the penal system that disproportionately affects
minorities and the poor and has become a significant burden on the taxpayers. This paper examines some of
the processes that contributed to the rise of the modern day carceral state, such as the determinate sentencing
reform and the proliferation of mandatory minimum sentencing. It also explores the unintended
consequences of these penal developments and traces the reaction and subsequent resistance to these
sentencing schemes from the judiciary, as well as other sources. Finally, this paper examines the dynamics of
power between various actors in the struggle for meaningful reforms in the penal system and argues for a
concerted action aimed at stimulating meaningful action from the legislature that has so far largely abstained
from major efforts at reforming the criminal justice system.
Keywords
penal system reform, mandatory minimum sentences, determinate sentencing
This peer-reviewed article is available in Themis: Research Journal of Justice Studies and Forensic Science:
http://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/themis/vol3/iss1/3
  
THEMIS 
46 
 
Justice  Reform:  Who’s  Got  the  Power? 
Yevgeniy Mayba 
 
 
 
Abstract 
As the US prison population continues to rise despite the 
significant decrease in crime rates, scholars and social activists 
are demanding comprehensive reforms to the penal system that 
disproportionately affects minorities and the poor and has 
become a significant burden on the taxpayers. This paper 
examines some of the processes that contributed to the rise of the 
modern day carceral state, such as the determinate sentencing 
reform and the proliferation of mandatory minimum sentencing. 
It also explores the unintended consequences of these penal 
developments and traces the reaction and subsequent resistance 
to these sentencing schemes from the judiciary, as well as other 
sources. Finally, this paper examines the dynamics of power 
between various actors in the struggle for meaningful reforms in 
the penal system and argues for a concerted action aimed at 
stimulating meaningful action from the legislature that has so far 
largely abstained from major efforts at reforming the criminal 
justice system. 
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Introduction 
Harsh mandatory minimum sentences are not unique to the 
US justice system, nor are they a recent development. From the 
“eye  for  an  eye”  justice  of  the  Hammurabi’s  Code  (Johns,  1904)  
to the US federal laws of 18th century that prescribe a 
“mandatory  10-year minimum prison term for causing a ship to 
run  aground  by  using  a  false  light”  (Luna  &  Cassell, 2010, p. 9), 
harsh mandatory punishments have been a feature of justice 
systems throughout the world. What is unique in the modern US 
justice system is the extent of the use of mandatory minimum 
sentences, the vastness of the array of crimes that are covered by 
mandatory minimum statutes, and the effect that these laws have 
had on the incarceration rates and the size of prison population 
over the last four decades. As the negative consequences of these 
laws became increasingly severe and both social and economic 
costs mounted, social advocacy groups and academia have 
responded with increasing criticism and demand for changes to 
the justice system. Among this backlash, a peculiar pattern of 
judicial activism has emerged with courts striving to restore 
judicial discretion in sentencing and establishing a new system 
of collaborative courts that aim to divert offenders from 
incarceration and into treatment programs. This ongoing contest 
between the legislative and judicial branches is particularly 
interesting when viewed through the prism of a larger struggle 
for policy and law making powers between these two branches 
of the government. As Horowitz (1977) argued in his 
examination of the judicial powers, courts have greatly expanded 
their policy making capacity through a series of key Supreme 
Court decisions that have affected  countrywide policy changes, 
infringing on the domain of the legislative branch and its sole 
capacity for law making.  
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Mandatory Minimum Sentences 
 Mandatory minimum sentences are a product of 
legislative statutes that prescribe sentences for particular 
offenses and oftentimes force judges to impose harsher sentences 
for particular sets of aggravating circumstances, such as gun 
possession or gang affiliation. With over 170 mandatory 
minimum penalties in the Federal Criminal Code alone (U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 2010) and countless similar statutes 
passed by state legislatures, mandatory minimum sentences have 
come to dominate the penal system and cover a wide variety of 
criminal offenses. Some mandatory minimum sentencing 
statutes, like the Rockefeller Drug Laws in New York and the 
Federal Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, automatically trigger 
prescribed mandatory sentences for simple possession and 
possession with intent to distribute certain legislatively 
determined and codified amounts of various illicit substances. 
Other statutes deal with issues such as gang membership, like the 
Illinois Unlawful Possession of a Firearm by a Street Gang 
member law, by imposing additional penalties on gang members 
for carrying a firearm outside of their homes (Kizer, 2012). 
Though varying in severity and scope, these statutes have one 
common theme, in that they leave little room for judicial 
discretion and effectively place sentencing power in the hands of 
the legislature that creates these statutes and the prosecutors who 
choose which charges to file against the offender.  
 One of the earliest examples of a radical shift away from 
the rehabilitation approach to solving social problems, and 
towards a mandatory sentencing framework, was the adoption of 
the Rockefeller Drug Laws in New York (Mann, 2013). 
Proposed by Nelson Rockefeller, who at that time was the 
governor of New York, and passed by the state legislature in 
3
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1973, these laws established harsh mandatory minimum 
sentences for drug possession and distribution, and created 
sentence enhancements for offenses committed under the 
influence of illicit substances. Even though Governor 
Rockefeller had previously viewed drugs as a social, rather than 
a criminal problem, the passage of these laws came in the wake 
of the declaration of the war on drugs by President Nixon and the 
rise   in   popularity   of   the   “tough   on   crime”   approach   that  
accompanied the shift to the determinate sentencing model 
(Mann, 2013).  
Determinate Sentencing Reform 
 The determinate sentencing reform that shifted penal 
practices towards mandatory minimum sentences was a response 
to the widespread criticism of the vast discrepancies in 
sentencing under the previous indeterminate model of sentencing 
and a call for a more just system characterized by consistency 
and fairness (Frankel, 1972). Since judicial discretion was 
viewed as a cornerstone of the system that allowed similarly 
situated offenders to be sentenced to drastically different 
punitive terms, the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 completely 
overhauled federal sentencing procedures, imposing strict limits 
on judicial discretion in sentencing (Cassidy, 2009). 
 The supporters of the determinate sentencing model have 
argued that the system of legislatively prescribed sentences 
effectively punishes, incapacitates, and deters offenders from 
committing future crimes (Lowenthal, 1993). For instance, Tittle 
and Rowe (1974) found that certainty of imprisonment deters the 
commission of offenses. These findings indicate that a system of 
harsh mandatory punishment creates a greater general deterrent 
effect and sends a message to all potential criminals that crimes 
would be punished in a certain, predictable and harsh manner 
4
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without exceptions and hope for leniency from the judge. 
Mandatory minimum sentences are also viewed by their 
supporters as useful tools for prosecutors and law enforcement 
officials. The potential of a harsh mandatory sentence can induce 
cooperation from the offender in exchange for reducing the 
charges and can lead to greater success in complex investigations 
as well as induce plea bargaining that avoids costly trials and 
saves time and money for the justice system and taxpayers (Luna 
& Cassell, 2010).  
 Prior to the determinate sentencing reform, the 
indeterminate sentencing model coupled with the rehabilitative 
approach to corrections allowed prison and parole officials to 
exercise their discretion in releasing inmates who were sentenced 
to an indeterminate sentence that ranged from a lower to an 
upper limit imposed by a judge. While this model allowed for a 
greater flexibility of the system and for an individual 
examination  of  each  offender’s  case  and  personal  circumstances,  
criticism of the disparity in sentencing of similar offenders as 
well as that of the rehabilitative model of corrections led to a 
series of reforms and a move towards the determinate sentencing 
model dominated by mandatory minimum sentencing statutes. 
This transition effectively transferred discretional powers from 
the judicial branch and corrections departments to the legislation 
passing these statutes and the executive-prosecutorial side of the 
system that implemented them (Luna & Cassell, 2010).  
 Although the seeds of the reform had already been 
planted with various laws such as the Crime Control and Safe 
Streets Act of 1968 that included mandatory sentencing 
enhancement for gun possession, the dismantling of the 
rehabilitation  model  of  corrections  can  be  traced  to  Martinson’s  
report on the efficacy of the rehabilitative programs in prisons 
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entitled What works? Questions and answers about prison 
reform (Martinson,   1974).  Also   known   as   the   “nothing  works”  
report, this examination of 231 studies of the efficacy of 
rehabilitation in prisons did not find any tangible results 
produced   by   these   programs.   The   report’s   findings   allowed  
critics   of   the   disparity   in   sentencing   that   hinged   on   offenders’  
alleged rehabilitation and subsequent early release to launch a 
legislative campaign that ushered in an era of determinate 
sentencing and major reductions in funding for rehabilitative 
programs in prisons. In 1989, the Supreme Court affirmed the 
legitimacy of this shift in its decision in Mistretta v. United 
States (1989), determining that the possibility of rehabilitation 
should not be a factor in sentencing. This decision also upheld 
the legitimacy of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 that 
established the US Sentencing Commission as an expert agency 
designed to significantly curb judicial discretion in sentencing 
through the creation of the Sentencing Guidelines.  
 These guidelines came into effect in 1987 and were 
designed to provide sentencing judges with a prescribed sentence 
depending on the circumstances of the case. Punishment was 
effectively limited to the ranges offered by the guidelines and the 
rigidity of the compulsory nature of these guidelines 
significantly curbed judicial discretion. While the Supreme Court 
upheld the constitutionality of the Sentencing Commission in 
Mistretta, many critics questioned the alleged expertise of the 
Commission, as well as its legitimacy given the fair amount of 
legislative power that was transferred to it by Congress (Luna & 
Cassell, 2010). 
 Ironically, while the Sentencing Guidelines were 
intended by the legislative branch to curb judicial discretion, 
they also contained a unique check on the possible abuse of the 
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executive power. While the new sentencing structure transferred 
discretionary authority in sentencing from the judicial to the 
executive branch by allowing prosecutors to determine which 
charges to pursue, it also endowed judges with the authority to 
serve as the fact finding body which enabled them to impose 
sentences harsher than those that were prescribed for the charges 
filed by the prosecutors (Starr & Rehavi, 2013). Designed to 
limit prosecutorial power used to coerce defendants into pleading 
guilty by threatening to file harsher charges at trial, this power of 
fact finding has not only failed its purpose, but on the contrary, 
has led to instances of judges imposing unjustifiably harsh 
sentences.  
 While the departure from the indeterminate sentencing 
model, which gave broad powers of discretion to sentencing 
judges and parole boards, is often justified by claims of resulting 
standardization of sentencing of similarly situated offenders, the 
extreme severity of the newly emerged determinate sentencing 
model based on legislatively prescribed harsh mandatory 
minimum sentences can, in large part, be attributed to the 
portrayal of crime in national media and the subsequent effects 
of  media  coverage  on  the  public’s  perception  of  crime.   
Media and Mass Hysteria 
 As major networks and their news programming faced 
stiffer competition in the late 1980s and early 1990s from an 
explosion of new channels, all-news networks, and later the 
internet, economic pressures and a drive for profits pushed them 
away   from   “hard   news”   and   towards   a   greater   emphasis   on  
sensationalist reporting of crime stories (Beale, 2006). As a 
result, despite the falling crime rates, crime became the leading 
topic covered in the evening news shows in the 1990s. While 
fewer than 100 murder stories per year were featured on the 
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news between 1990 and 1992, that number rose to 511 between 
1997 and 1999, with greater prevalence of criminal trials and 
investigations in the news coverage than of political and social 
issues (Beale, 2006). This drastic increase in crime coverage 
created an atmosphere of fear through which various civil 
liberties have been curtailed by the enhanced power of the 
government and the increased ease of prosecution (Simon, 
2007). 
 Along with the increased coverage of crime in the news, 
crime-themed programming that Wacquant (2010) referred to as 
“crystallization  of  law-and-order  pornography”  (p.  206)  has  also  
permeated  commercial  media.  Hamilton’s   (1998) exploration of 
this phenomenon reveals that the level of violence in television 
programming   is   directly   related   to   broadcasters’   attempts   to  
attract particular audiences and is also dependent on the products 
to be advertised. As specific brand identities are established and 
promoted to specific audiences, violence levels in the media are 
adjusted to maximize programming attractiveness to advertisers 
with little regard for accurate representation of societal issues 
(Beale, 2006).  
 News   media’s   presentation of violent crime as a 
widespread phenomenon directed public attention to crime as a 
perceived social issue of great importance, and greatly 
influenced the criteria by which the public judges proposed and 
existing public policies, as well as how it views its officials and 
candidates for office (Beale, 2006, Simon 2007). Politicians 
responded   to   this  mass  hysteria  with  “tough-on-crime”  slogans,  
and by 1992, political debate on the relative merits of 
punishment and rehabilitation had all but disappeared, as the 
consensus   of   “law   and   order”   was   reached   by   both   political  
parties (Platt, 2011). With political rhetoric echoing 
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disproportionate coverage of crime on television and in print, the 
United States justice system embarked on an unprecedented 
punishment  spree  that  helped  to  make  America  “the  single  most  
punitive  Western   nation   and   the   world’s   imprisonment   leader”  
(Luna & Cassell, 2010, p. 22). 
 The Federal Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 that 
established federal mandatory minimum sentences for drug 
offenses was enacted by Congress as a response to the mass 
hysteria over the crack cocaine epidemic (Luna & Cassel, 2010). 
This rise in public concern was flamed by the media during a 
decade-long campaign that painted a picture of crack as being 
widespread, highly addictive, and a major cause of violent 
crimes despite the lack of evidence to support such claims 
(Reinarman & Levine, 2004). Adding to the hysteria and the 
calls   for  drastic  measures  was   the   “crack  babies”  myth,   largely  
based on limited and questionable research that failed to take 
into account compounding factors, such as malnourishment, lack 
of prenatal care, alcohol and tobacco abuse, as well as personal 
medical histories. Presented to the public without any empirical 
evidence, the myth persists today despite substantial amounts of 
research showing that crack cocaine does not cause extensive 
damage as claimed by various experts on television shows, and 
that the damage that can be attributed to the use of crack cocaine 
can be reversed with proper medical care and a stable home 
environment (Reinarman & Levine, 2004).  
 Some magazines and newspapers later published 
retractions and articles admitting that the crack cocaine problem 
had been greatly exaggerated (Reinarman & Levine, 2004). Yet, 
the 100 to 1 sentencing disparity between cocaine and crack 
cocaine created by the Anti-Drug Abuse Act in 1986 persisted 
until 2010 when the Fair Sentencing Act lowered this 
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discrepancy   to  18  to  1.  The   influence  of   the  media’s  inaccurate  
and greatly exaggerated portrayal of the crack cocaine epidemic 
can be seen in the failure of the Fair Sentencing Act to reduce 
sentencing disparity to the intended 1 to 1 ratio, with some 
opposing politicians predicting the return of inner city violence 
that would endanger children (Luna & Cassell, 2010). 
 Similar media-fueled hysteria has led to a significant 
reform of the juvenile justice system. Despite national crime 
statistics indicating a decline in crime rates, several academics 
created and promoted an idea of an upcoming generation of 
juvenile   “super-predators”   (Pizarro,   Chermak   &   Gruenewald,  
2007),   who   were   “radically   impulsive,   brutally   remorseless  
youngsters, including ever more pre-teenage boys, who murder, 
assault, rape, rob, burglarize, deal deadly drugs, join gun toting 
gangs and create serious communal disorders" (Bennett, Dilulio, 
& Walters, 1996, p. 27). Although Dilulio later admitted to being 
wrong   about   the   emergence   of   these   “super-predator”   juveniles  
(Becker, 2001), the damage had been done. Overestimating the 
volume and seriousness of the crime for which the juvenile 
offenders were responsible, almost all states passed legislation 
allowing the transfer of juvenile offenders to adult justice 
systems and subjecting them to mandatory minimum sentences, 
including sentences of life in prison without possibility of parole 
(Roberts, 2004).  
 Driven by political ambition, moral panic, and 
diminishing discussion of social issues in the media, determinate 
sentencing reforms and mandatory minimum sentences triggered 
an unprecedented growth of the correctional and justice system 
in the United States. With academics arguing that the modern 
penal system creates, and subsequently subjugates, a new 
underclass of the poor and minorities through selective 
10
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enforcement and negative stigmatization (Alexander, 2012), or 
controls a surplus of workforce population through increased 
criminalization and reduction in social welfare programs 
(Wacquant, 2010), the consequences of the determinate 
sentencing reform have been scrutinized and critiqued at great 
length. 
Consequences and Efficacy of Mandatory Minimum 
Sentences 
 One of the most tangible consequences of the 
determinate sentencing reform and the increased severity of 
punishments has been the significant increase in prison 
populations across the United States. Federal prison population 
has increased tenfold since 1980, while the average length of a 
federal sentence doubled and the average length of a federal drug 
sentence tripled (Luna & Cassell, 2010). According to the 
Bureau of Justice Statistics, there were approximately 6,937,600 
offenders under some form of correctional supervision in the 
United States in 2012, of which 2,228,400 were incarcerated in 
prisons and local jails (Glaze & Herberman, 2013). At the same 
time, the spending on both the   federal   and   states’   correctional  
systems has increased 660% between 1982 and 2006 (Seiter, 
2011). This increase is considerably greater than the increase in 
the police and judicial spending combined (Seiter, 2011). With 
estimated costs of incarcerating an offender being between 
$20,000 and $40,000 per year (Spelman, 2009), the federal 
corrections costs alone increased by 925% between 1982 and 
2007 to an annual budget of $5.4 billion (U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 2010). 
 Proponents of the system of severe punishment have 
argued that increased incapacitation of violent offenders creates 
a   specific   deterrent   effect   by   limiting   offender’s   ability   to  
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recidivate (Shinnar & Shinnar, 1975; Mueller, 1992). This 
argument, however, ignores the current lack of rehabilitative 
programs in prisons, which in turn may lead to inmates picking 
up criminal activities and skills from other inmates and 
furthering their criminal careers upon their release. It also fails to 
account for the possibility of incapacitated criminals being 
replaced on the street by other individuals in the community 
(Piehl, Useem & Dilulio, 1999). In the particular case of drug 
offenders, the argument for further prison expansion runs 
contrary to the principle of diminishing returns. As Piehl, Useem 
and Dilulio (1999) demonstrated, when the most serious 
offenders  are  apprehended,  “prison  growth  requires  the  criminal  
justice system to reach deeper into the pool of prison-eligible 
offenders, such that increases in incarceration are less and less 
cost-effective”   (p.   12).   The   increase   in   sentence   severity   for  
violent crimes – as well as drug offenses – has created a net 
widening effect that increased the punitiveness of the justice 
system as a whole, with many offenders serving jail and prison 
sentences when the severity of their crime does not warrant such 
harsh sentences (Morris & Tonry, 1991). 
 The increasing costs of maintaining a large prison 
population, and the judicial apparatus required to process large 
numbers of offenders have drained state budgets and caused a 
decrease in numbers of law enforcement officers on the job. 
Corman and Mocan (2000) demonstrated in their research that 
putting more officers on the street led to a significant reduction 
in crime rates. Their study examined records from a crime 
analysis unit of the New York Police Department, as well as 
records from various other city agencies for a 30-year period 
since 1970. They compared crime rates with numbers of police 
officers employed by the city and revealed that increases in 
12
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numbers of police officers corresponded with significant 
reduction in robberies, burglaries, and motor vehicle theft, as 
well as minor reduction in murder and assault rates. They 
supplemented their study with research examining the effect of 
economic factors on crime rates (Corman & Mocan, 2005). 
Using the data from their previous research, they looked at the 
relationship between crime rates and unemployment rate, as well 
as minimum wage and prison population. The study also 
examined the effect of arrests regardless of whether they resulted 
in convictions. They found that a decline in unemployment rate 
corresponded to declining rates for burglaries and motor vehicle 
theft. Increased numbers of arrests corresponded to decreases in 
crime rates and were consistent with increases in the numbers of 
police officers employed by the city. Combined with the results 
from their previous research, these findings indicate that 
increased certainty of punishment through increases in police 
presence and arrests, along with improved economic conditions, 
can effectively lower crime rates. Their findings, with regards to 
a lack of a relationship between crime rates and prison 
population, however, suggest that increases in prison population 
do not have a deterrent effect and do not contribute to decreasing 
crime rates (Corman & Mocan, 2005). The above referenced 
research and findings are supported by similar research by Evans 
and Owens (2006), who examined the effect of the Community 
Oriented Policing Services program aimed at increasing the 
number of police officers by providing federal funding to state 
and local agencies for hiring and training purposes. Their 
examination of 2074 cities and towns in the 11 year period 
starting in 1990 revealed significant reductions in motor vehicle 
theft, burglaries, robberies and aggravated assaults, which 
13
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corresponded to the increase in number of police officers on the 
job (Evans & Owen, 2006). 
 The critiques of increased use of incarceration as a 
means of increasing general deterrence have also been supported 
by Durlauf and Nagin (2011), who demonstrated that 
California’s  Three  Strikes  Law  has  managed  to  reduce  the  felony  
crime rate by only 2%. They also argued that the declining crime 
rates were not a direct result of such laws, since the analysis of 
annual data demonstrated not only that crime rates have begun to 
decline prior to their existence, but also that the rate of the 
decline has remained constant and has appeared to be unaffected 
by these laws and statutes (Durlauf & Nagin, 2011).  
 In addition to sapping the resources from law 
enforcement, the increased spending required to support long 
sentences and large numbers of prison inmates created by the 
determinate sentencing reform have also contributed to the 
underfunding of the prosecutors. As Gershowitz and Killinger 
(2011) pointed out, due to the lack of funding, most prosecutors 
are overburdened with caseloads. Such conditions have resulted 
in prosecutors committing inadvertent mistakes that may have 
led to the incarceration of an innocent person, or a not guilty 
verdict for a guilty one. This lack of resources and manpower 
has also led to trial delays, which often results in guilty pleas by 
innocent people in exchange for a sentence of time already 
served while awaiting trial. Although underfunded and 
undermanned, the prosecutors remain one of the most powerful 
court agents. While judicial discretion has been severely limited 
by the determinate sentencing reform and the introduction of 
mandatory minimum sentences and mandatory enhancements, 
prosecutors still have the ultimate decision power over which 
14
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charges are going to be filed and which crimes are to be 
prosecuted.  
 Despite the fact that prosecutors are oftentimes 
motivated to bring harsher charges and achieve higher conviction 
rates due to their career ambitions (Boylan & Long, 2005), some 
prosecutors began exercising their discretion and charging 
offenders with lesser crimes to avoid lengthy sentences of 
incarceration   in   response   to   the   introduction   of   California’s  
Three Strikes laws (Gershowitz & Killinger, 2011). 
 Overwhelmed and overworked, prosecutors are forced to 
circumvent the existing mandatory sentencing laws in order to 
restore the element of justice to the current system of 
punishment. However, while prosecutorial discretion can serve 
as a safeguard for the justice system, it can also result in a 
violation of one of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the 
constitution, the right to trial. As Marvell and Moody (2000) 
demonstrated in their comprehensive study of the effect of 
determinate sentencing laws on trial delay and rates, determinate 
sentencing laws increase court delays and generally cause a 
decline in the rates of jury trials. Mandatory enhancements and 
charge-based sentencing also allow the prosecution to decide the 
degree of leniency that courts may consider. As Lowenthal 
(1993) pointed out, 
Prosecutors can charge mandatory enhancement 
allegations in all cases in which there is a factual basis 
for doing so, even when sufficiently mitigating 
circumstances indicate that the enhancement provisions 
should not be enforced. The mandatory sentencing 
consequences of a guilty verdict pressure defendants, 
who   otherwise   might   test   the   state’s   evidence,   into  
accepting guilty pleas. Indeed, a legislature can make 
15
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charge-based mandatory punishment so commonplace 
and severe that few if any defendants will be willing to 
chance a trial. (p. 78) 
And as Luna and Cassell (2010) concluded in their review of 
mandatory minimum sentencing scheme: 
…   [A]   number   of   studies   suggest   that   the   use   of  
federal mandatory minimums has tended to generate 
disparate sentences among similarly situated offenders. 
The claim of crime reduction has been contested as well, 
with most researchers finding no deterrent effect from 
mandatory sentencing laws. The statistics also seem to 
belie categorical assertions of government necessity. The 
rate   of   cooperation   (or   “substantial   assistance”)   in  
mandatory minimum cases is comparable to the average 
in all federal cases, while most recipients of federal drug 
minimums are couriers, mules, and street-level dealers, 
not kingpins or leaders in international drug cartels. (pp. 
19-20) 
Restoring Judicial Discretion in Sentencing 
 While testifying before the Congressional Subcommittee 
on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security in the hearing on 
mandatory minimum sentences and their unintended 
consequences in 2009, Chief Judge Julie Carnes, speaking on the 
behalf of the Judicial Conference of the United States, stated that 
mandatory provisions  
…[S]weep  broadly,   sweeping   in  both   the   egregious 
offender as well as other less culpable offenders who 
may have violated the statute. Necessarily, the sentence 
that may be appropriate for the most egregious offender 
will often be excessive for this less culpable person. 
(U.S. Government Printing Office, 2010, p. 35) 
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Her statement was seconded by Texas Judge Ted Poe, who 
stated   that   “Congress   cannot,   even   in   its   great   wisdom,   pass  
appropriate legislation to cover every type of criminal case that 
there  is  because  there  are  no  two  cases  alike”  (U.S.  Government 
Printing Office, 2010, p. 33). Both of these statements reflect a 
growing judicial frustration with mandatory minimum 
sentencing schemes and their effect on sentencing structure. This 
frustration has led to judicial activism that resulted in a series of 
Supreme Court cases that amended the role of the Sentencing 
Guidelines and restored a measure of judicial discretion in 
sentencing.  
 In the early 2000s, the U.S. Supreme Court began 
redefining its Sixth Amendment jurisprudence with Apprendi v. 
New Jersey (2000) and Blakeley v. Washington (2004). Although 
the Court did not discuss the Sentencing Guidelines at length, it 
held   in   both   cases   that   any   fact   that   increases   a   defendant’s  
sentence must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury 
despite its previous refusals to extend trial phase procedural 
protection to sentencing hearings (Cassidy, 2009). Similarly to 
Apprendi and Blakely, United States v. Booker (2005) dealt with 
the issue of fact-finding authority of judges and the provision of 
the Sentencing Guidelines that mandated judges to impose 
sentences within the specified ranges. While the jury found 
Booker guilty of possessing at least 50 grams of crack cocaine, 
the sentencing judge found additional evidence and, following 
the Sentencing Guidelines, increased his minimum sentence by 
20 years. The Court ruled that since this provision of the 
Guidelines was mandatory and binding on all judges, it violated 
the   Sixth   Amendment.   The   Court’s   decision   made   Sentencing  
Guidelines effectively advisory and allowed district courts to 
deviate from them during sentencing. In addition to confirming 
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its new interpretation of its Sixth Amendment jurisdiction in 
Booker, the Court also reintroduced the role of judicial fact-
finding during sentencing, by allowing judges to deviate from 
the Sentencing Guidelines necessitating further clarifications of 
this decision. 
 In Rita v. United States (2007), the Court reiterated its 
position on the advisory nature of the Guidelines by stating that 
courts of appeals may, although not required to, presume that a 
sentence within the Guidelines is reasonable. It also stated that 
appellate   courts   must   treat   judges’   choice   of   sentence   with  
deference (Cassidy, 2009). In Kimbrough v. United States 
(2007), the Supreme Court overturned the vacating of a sentence 
by the Court of Appeals and ruled that a sentence outside the 
guidelines range was reasonable, even when based on the district 
judge’s   disagreement   with   the   100:1   sentencing   disparity   in  
crack cocaine vs. cocaine cases. The Court further promoted 
district   judges’   discretion   in   Gall v. United States (2007) by 
ruling that an appellate court may not reverse a sentence based 
on the fact that it might have reached a different conclusion. The 
Court reaffirmed that deference must be given to  district  judges’  
discretion and that the totality of all circumstances must be taken 
into consideration during the sentence review by an appellate 
court (Cassidy, 2009). Following Kimbrough and Gall, district 
courts were free to exercise their discretion in sentencing crack 
and powder cocaine offenders, and to deviate from the 100:1 
ratio established by the Sentencing Guidelines and the Anti-Drug 
Abuse Act in 1986. 
 This restoration of judicial discretion in sentencing 
remains a controversial issue. In his dissent in Booker, Justice 
Stevens predicted the return of the sentencing disparities that 
necessitated the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, and the 2010 
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and 2013 reports of the U.S. Sentencing Commission appears to 
support his opinion, finding that the black-white sentencing gap 
among similarly situated offenders has quadrupled since the 
Booker decision (Sessions et al., 2010). However, a study 
conducted by Bourassa and Andreescu (2009) to examine 
sentencing disparities and racial inequality in Kentucky, 
demonstrated that 34% of interracial differences in sentencing 
can be explained by the characteristics of each case, with the use 
of public attorneys being one of the most significant variables 
contributing to these differences. While these findings 
demonstrate the existence of systemic problems that go beyond 
judicial discretion in sentencing, Starr and Rehavi (2013) found 
that pre-sentencing decisions of prosecutors have substantial 
consequences on the disparity in sentencing and find that racial 
disparity in sentencing did not increase since Booker. 
The Rise of the Collaborative Courts 
 Born out of judicial frustration with the cyclical nature 
of treatment of drug offenders, as well as the mentally ill and the 
homeless by the justice system, collaborative courts aim to 
emphasize cooperation between all courtroom agents involved in 
promoting treatment and rehabilitation of offenders to achieve 
meaningful resolutions of social problems. These courts include 
specialized courts for veterans, drug users, delinquent juveniles, 
domestic violence cases, and for addressing many other social 
problems that a conventional justice system is ill equipped to 
deal with.  
 Convinced  of   the   justice   system’s   failure   to   adequately  
address social problems, state courts began to deviate from 
imposing harsh prison and jail sentences in the late 1980s. 
Encouraged by the success of the experimental Miami-Dade 
Drug Court established in 1989, judges in other states began 
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establishing their own versions of such diversionary programs 
within   state   courts’   administration   (Wolf,   2005).   While   the  
legislature remained unwilling to tackle the problem of 
inefficient and ineffective drug enforcement practices in the 
justice system, despite several reports from the Sentencing 
Commission urging reform, state judiciaries have organized a 
concerted effort to bring together drug users and treatment 
programs. The California Drug Court Task Force appointed by 
Chief Justice George brought together judges, prosecutors, 
defense attorneys, probation staff and treatment providers to 
facilitate the coordination of services to those in need of them 
(Wolf, 2005). 
 As collaborative courts have decreased caseloads and 
diverted non-violent offenders from state prisons and local jails, 
there is a growing movement towards adapting the practices of 
collaborative courts to the conventional adversarial courts 
(Farole, Puffet & Rempel, 2005). 
However, despite the successes of collaborative courts 
illustrated by a study that found Stanislaus County drug courts to 
produce a 1:13 cost-benefit ratio (Carey, Crumpton, Finigan & 
Waller, 2005), they are not a perfect solution to the variety of 
social problems that the justice system has been forced to deal 
with. As Leon and Shdaimah (2012) pointed out, collaborative 
courts can have a negative effect on those they strive to serve by 
coercing them into compliance with the program, which forces 
them to either plead guilty or assume a stigma of deviance in 
order to receive services. The practice of coercion that is used to 
facilitate participation in more cost-effective collaborative courts 
raises concerns over the due process rights of defendants who are 
threatened with harsher punishment if they choose to fight their 
cases. Additionally, collaborative courts rely on the threat of 
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future punishment in order to ensure compliance with court 
mandated treatments and supervision programs. Quinn (2009) 
pointed out that amidst the stories of success, stories of people 
who fail out of these programs get overlooked, despite the fact 
that these people oftentimes get sent to prison to serve longer 
sentences than they would have if they went through the 
conventional justice system. While an imperfect solution, the 
collaborative courts have been forced to attempt reforms from 
inside the justice system, in the absence of meaningful legislative 
action, and have contributed to the growing awareness of 
alternative solutions to various social problems. 
Recent  Changes:  Who’s  Got  the  Power? 
 As discussed earlier, despite the criticism of the 
determinate sentencing scheme from academics, the Judicial 
Conference of the United States, and various non-profit 
organizations such as the Families Against Mandatory 
Minimums (FAMM), American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), 
and Law Enforcement Against Prohibition (LEAP), legislatures 
have been reluctant to implement significant changes to the 
justice system. As Graham (2011) pointed out, instead of 
amending   flawed   statutes,   “political   forces   typically   place  
upward pressure on criminal punishments or encourage 
adherence to   the   status   quo”   (p.   769).  Although   the  passage   of  
the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 might appear to be the rare case 
of legislative initiative to amend the justice system, the 
examination of underlying forces behind this reform reveals a 
persistent pattern of reluctance to implement changes.  
 As judges and academics began to speak out against the 
100:1 sentencing disparity between cases involving crack 
cocaine and powder cocaine in the 1990s, the Sentencing 
Commission began an investigation into the efficacy of this 
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sentencing policy. Drafted as a response to the congressional 
demand to examine cocaine sentencing policy, Sentencing 
Commission’s   1995   report   found   that,   “1)   the   100:1   ratio   was  
disproportionate to the harms associated with the two drugs; 2) 
courts could address the harms associated with crack through 
specific non-drug-related enhancements; and 3) crack penalties 
fell disproportionately on lower-level participants, most often 
African-Americans”   (Cassidy,   2009,   p.   114).   These   findings,  
along with the recommendations for reform, were echoed in 
three subsequent reports in 1997, 2002, and 2007, but received 
no response from Congress. Following the 2007 report, the 
Commission took action itself and implemented changes to the 
Sentencing Guidelines that retroactively reduced average crack 
cocaine sentence by 15 months. In addition to the actions taken 
by the Sentencing Commission, a concerted lobbying campaign 
by the coalition of advocacy groups, such as the National 
Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), 
ACLU, and The Sentencing Project – as well as some of the 
Christian conservative and law enforcement organizations that 
joined the movement – have prodded Congress to implement 
changes that were demanded by President Obama and Attorney 
General Holder (Gotsch, 2011).  
 Among other notable recent changes in sentencing 
policy are Colorado Amendment 64 and Washington Initiative 
502, both of which legalized recreational use of marijuana 
despite federal classification of the drug as a schedule one 
substance. Supported by state government officials, lawyers, 
clergy members, and health officials, both of these reforms were 
passed by popular vote during statewide referenda, indicating a 
growing trend to bypass legislature in achieving criminal justice 
reforms.  
22
Themis: Research Journal of Justice Studies and Forensic Science, Vol. 3 [2015], Art. 3
http://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/themis/vol3/iss1/3
  
THEMIS 
68 
 This trend is also evident in recent changes to 
California’s   justice   system   with   Proposition   36   amending   the  
state’s   Three   Strikes   law   in   2012,   and   the   recently   passed  
Proposition 47 reducing punishments for some non-violent 
offenses and permitting retroactive resentencing. Proposition 36 
was supported by several county district attorneys, law 
professors, NAACP, and the Democratic party and passed with 
69.3% of the vote. Proposition 47 passed with 59.3% of the vote, 
but received a much greater bipartisan support. While many 
district attorneys and sheriffs opposed Proposition 47, its 
supporters included, among many others, both Democratic and 
Republican politicians, as well as the NAACP, ACLU, The 
Sentencing Project, Victim/Survivors Networks, and various 
women’s,   religious,   and   health   organizations.   Although   these  
changes were not brought forth by state legislatures, the increase 
in the number and diversity of supporters for meaningful 
changes in criminal justice has the potential to spur legislatures 
to   action,   as   was   the   case   with   Congress’   passage   of   the   Fair  
Sentencing Act of 2010.  
 Courts have also demonstrated their ability to force 
action from the legislature. In Brown v. Plata (2011), the 
Supreme   Court   declared   that   California’s   prison overcrowding 
violated the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution. The Court 
ordered the state to reduce its prison population to 137.5% of its 
correctional   system’s   design   capacity,   but   allowed   the   state   to  
decide on the means by which it would be done (Brown v. Plata, 
2011).  Forced   to   take   action,  California’s   legislature   responded  
to this decision by passing the Assembly Bill (AB) 109 and 
AB117, also known as the Realignment Legislation. Under the 
policy introduced by these bills, the newly sentenced non-violent 
felony offender will now serve their sentence in county jails 
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rather than state prisons, and persons found to be in technical 
violations of their probation can no longer be returned to state 
prisons and must be sanctioned to county jails or other 
alternative sanctions, such as house arrest and intensive 
probation. Although realignment reform did decrease 
California’s   state   prison   population   by   nearly   30,000  people,   it  
has merely shifted the focus of correctional control to county 
probation departments and jails (Quan, Abarbanel & Mukamal, 
2014), demonstrating the inability of courts to force meaningful 
changes without supportive legislative action.  
Conclusion 
 As Rosenberg (2008) pointed out, without significant 
political and administrative support, courts are limited in their 
capacity to enact sweeping changes to social institutions. The 
controversy of the Booker decision, coupled with certain 
negative aspects of using collaborative courts to solve social 
problems, indicate the lack of suitability of the court system to 
be the source of comprehensive justice reforms. Court initiatives, 
however, combined with the growing movement of social 
advocacy groups and non-governmental agencies can influence 
legislative action and bring about constructive changes to the 
justice system. The persistence of lobbying by non-governmental 
groups  and  courts’  demonstrations  of  plausible  alternatives  to  the  
mass incarceration policy have prompted the Department of 
Justice review of all phases of the criminal justice system. 
Following this review, Attorney General Holder launched the 
Smart on Crime campaign aimed at reforming the justice system 
through  amending  Department  of  Justice’s  policies  and  practices,  
as well as seeking political support and action from Congress 
(Department of Justice, 2013). Now, more than ever, there 
appears to be some political support for meaningful reforms.  
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 In August of 2013, a bill was introduced in the senate 
called the Smarter Sentencing Act. If passed, this legislation will 
make the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 retroactive, reduce 
mandatory minimum sentences for drug offenses, and expand the 
existing   “safety   valve”   exception   for   federal   drug   offenses   that  
allows judges to sentence offenders below the mandatory 
minimum sentence if they meet certain criteria (H.R. 3382, 
2013). The proposition of this bill in Congress, however, is not 
enough, as similar bills have been voted down before. A 
concerted rigorous campaign by advocacy groups, judges, and 
social movements must persist and continue to prod legislatures 
to take action.  
 State and federal legislatures have the ultimate power to 
create and fund alternative institutions that can address various 
social problems. While legislatures failed to exercise a measure 
of restraint when dealing with moral panics in the past, only they 
have the power to correct their mistakes through meaningful 
legislative reform. However, where Horowitz (1977) sees an 
ongoing struggle for policymaking between the courts and 
legislatures, and where Rosenberg (2008) denies courts the 
power to enact changes on their own, there exists a much more 
intricate power dynamic. While legislatures do hold the true 
power to change the system, courts can greatly influence and 
empower reluctant politicians. Through their decisions in legal 
cases, courts provide legitimacy and empower social advocacy 
groups, while the successes of the collaborative courts strengthen 
their demands for alternative means of dealing with social 
problems. These advocacy groups, along with the courts, 
increase societal awareness of both the problem and the 
possibility of reform. It is that awareness and the changes in 
public opinion that can create a tipping point and force 
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politicians   to   abandon   the   old   adage   of   “tough   on   crime”   and  
embrace smarter and more efficient policies and practices.  
 Societal changes do not occur overnight, nor do they 
occur in a vacuum of legislative action. All social agents and 
institutions hold a measure of power to bring forth meaningful 
changes in the criminal justice reform. The real change, 
however, will only happen when, and only if, all of these actors 
play their parts in an intricate scheme of power distribution in 
today’s  society. 
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